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Abstract: This paper examines and analyzes the peace process between 
the Government of the Philippines (GPH) and the Moro Islamic Liberation 
Front (MILF) known as GPH-MILF peace process with particular focus 
on search for viable blueprint that would be acceptable to both parties, 
their respective constituents and other stakeholders. It is divided into 
several parts. First part revisits the GPH-MILF peace process. The 
second part suggests recommendations: the political and administrative, 
economic, security, humanitarian and social dimensions. And finally, 
the concluding remarks. The data for this analysis came from primary 
and secondary sources, namely newspapers, policy statements, speeches, 
press releases, joint cornrnuniquC, peace agreements, books, magazines, 
and journals. Interviews with some informed people were also conducted. 
The study found that though the GPH-MILF peace has long way to go 
due some fundamental issues, it has, nevertheless, achieved significant 
progress that m7y lead to the final conclusion of the conflict in the region 
in the near future. 
BACKGROUND OF THE STUDY 
This part briefly discusses a decade-long peace process between the Government of 
the Philippines (GPH) and the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) that has started 
in 1997. The peace process has led to a series of agreements. For instance, in 1997, 
both parties signed an Agreement on General Cessation of Hostilities (AGCH) and 
its Implementing Administrative Guidelines. This agreement urged the two parties 
specifically to refrain from any provocative and hostile. When the Philippine President 
Joseph Estrada assumed the presidency in 1998, peace talks continued desperately. The 
situation on the ground was volatile. Conflict escalated in other areas. The GPH and 
MILF leadershi~s exchanged accusations of violation of their ~revious ameements. 
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The peace talks finally collapsed on 27 April 2000, when President Joseph Estrada 
declared an all-out war policy against the MILF throughout the Southern Philippines 
(Rizal G. Buendia, 2004: 206-7). 
However, when President Estrada was ousted from office in 2000 through the People's 
Power II,  his deputy Gloria Macapagal Arroyo assumed the presidency. Immediately 
after she assumed power, she reversed her predecessor's policy, porn an all- out-war 
policy to an all-out peace policy and immediately invited the MILF leadership to 
settle their differences with the GPH once more through peaceful means (Rizal G. 1 
Buendia, 2004: 206-7). To revive trust and confidence that President Estrada had { 
broken, former President Arroyo adopted Confidence-Building Measures with the j 
MILF leadership, but the latter refused her call. ~ i t h f h i s ,  the GPH had no option. but 
to use a third party whom the MILF may trust. In December 2000. former Philippine { 
President Arroyo personally asked for the help of former Malaysian Prime Minister 
Dr. Mahathlr Mohamad to persuade the MILF to s ~ t  and settle their differences with ! 
the GPH peacefully. The MILF accepted the invitation with conditions which the GPH 
' 
accepted. This gave momentum for the resumption of the stalled peace talks. As a 
result, both parties (GPH and MILF) immediately suspended their military offensive 
against each other. The GPH, under the leadership Gloria Macapagal Arroyo and the 
MILF, under Chairman Sheikh Salamat Hashim, again signed peace agreements. 
On June 22, 2001, the two parties inked an agreement (known as first round) that 
focused on the security dimension, rehabilitation and aspects of the ancestral domain. 
This was followed by a series of talks known as the second and third rounds plainly 
focused on implementing the guidelines on ceasefire agreement in the region. These 
agreements were often violated rather than respected. For instance, on March 2003, 
hardliner members of the AFP and some political leaders who opposed the peace 
initiative with the MILF launched a military campaign against the MILF. They accused 
the MILF of harboring or even training not only local terrorists groups (Alonto's 
group), but also regional ones such as Indonesian terrorists (Zulkifli, Mustaqim and 
some others). In February 2003, the AFP attacked the Islamic Center, known as Buliok 
Complex, a MILF stronghold, in the province of North Cotabato, during Holy Feast 
of SacriJice (Eid-21 Adha). This angered the MILF leadership and they subsequently 
declared J i h d  against the GPH and its agents. Both parties accused each other of 
insincerity and violation of their previous agreements. 
But with the facilitation of Malaysia, the MILF finally responded positively and thus, 
the peace negotiation was back on track. Thus, on March 28,2003, both parties issued 
Joint Statement at Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia, and agreed to renew their commitment 
to achieve a comprehensive, lasting and just political settlement in the region. They 
also agreed to implement all past agreements, the reaffirmation of the provision about 
the granting of safety and security, exercise mutual restrain and activation of the 
Bangsamoro Development Agency (BDA). These series of agreements were forged 
by the GPH and the MILF to further clarify and resolve the issues at hand. But again 
and again those peace agreements were often violated than respected by both parties 
on the ground. 
Following the death of Sheikh Salarnat Hashim in July 2003, he was succeeded by 
Murad Ebrahim as the new MILF chairman. Right after his assumption of the leadership 
of the organization, Murad Ebrahim reorganized and reactivated the organization. He 
also promised to continue his predecessor's legacy. 
The MILF, under Murad leadership, continued to negotiate with the GPH. In 
February 2004, five rounds of exploratory talks in Malaysia laid the groundwork for 
a Malaysian Advance Survey Team to spend a week in the Southern Philippines from 
22 March 2004, preparing for the deployment of an OIC-led International Monitoring 
Team (IMT) that comprised Malaysia, Libya, and Brunei in the region. The IMT was 
mandated to observe and monitor the implementation of the cessation of hostilities, 
conduct field verification of the alleged violation of the GPH-MILF agreements and 
report to the GPH and MILF's Peace Panels its findings and assessment on the alleged 
violation. Indeed, the deployments of the IMT to the conflict affected areas minimized 
the aggressiveness and hostilities of both disputing parties. Such restraining behaviors 
on both parties gave space for diplomacy as a way of settling their differences. 
In 2005, the GPH and the MILF pace panels met in Malaysia many times and 
discussed substantive issues on governance and ancestral domain (concept, territory 
and resources). This led to a series of consensus points. As a result, in 2008, the GPH- 
MILF crafted an agreement on Memorandum of Agreement on Ancestral Domain 
(MoA-AD), but it was declared unconstitutional by the Supreme Court. The MOA-AD 
with MILF would set up the Bangsamoro Homeland with the Bangsamoro Juridical 
Entity (BJE) as its governing body in parts of Mindanao. Under the agreement, the 
BJE would have the power to set up its own security, trade, education, elections, and 
the right to explore and develop natural resources in the said territory. 
On June 3, 2010, GPH-MILF peace panels signed an Interim Agreement supposedly 
as a framework of the continuity of the negotiation as agreed in their Declaration of 
Continuity. (See The GRP-MILF Declaration of Continuity signed in Kuala Lumpur, 
June 3, 2010). 
! 
On January 13,201 1, the peace panels of the GPH and the MILF received resounding 
commendation for the positive results achieved during informal talks in Kuala Lumpur 
brokered by the Malaysia because both parties (the Panels of the government and 
MILF being chaired by Dean Marvic Leonen and Mohagher Iqbal, respectively) 
agreed to resume the negotiations on February 9 and 10, 201 1. They also agreed to 
address the cases of 25 MILF political detainees that include MILF leaders, and issues 
pertinent to the IMT, GPH-MILF Adhoc Joint Action Group (AHJAG), GPH-MILF 
coordinating Committee on the Cessation of Hostilities (CCCH), and the Bangsamoro 
Leadership and Management Institute (BLMI). This was followed by Aquino-Murad 
Meeting where both leaders agreed to fast tract the GPH-MILF peace process. 
In 201 1, The MILF has submitted a Comprehensive Compact containing the proposal 
to create a Bangsamoro sub-state as the way of resolving the decades-old Mindanao 
problem. (Romv Elusfa. 201 1 : 1'1. 
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Government on the other hand submitted a counter-proposal, a "three-in-onen 
framework for negotiations that includes a development package, reforming the 
Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao, and correcting the narratives of the Moro 
history. (Romy Elusfa, 201 1 : 1). But MILF chair Murad Ebrahim said they need not 
negotiate with government if the latter will only insist on the "doables" because they 
can do anything and no one can bar them from doing it." He called the two proposals 
"heaven and earth". (Romy Elusfa, 201 1 : 1). 
THE RECOMMENDATIONS 
The Political and Administrative Dimension t. 
Since the Bangsamoro's population has surrounded by controversy. It. however, 
constitutes about 8 per cent of the total population of the Philippines, and since the 
region has its historical, cultural and administrative unique character, and since the 
peace agreements (the 1976 Tripoli and 1996 Jakarta Agreements) signed between 
the GPH and the MNLF fell short as a comprehensive and workable model, a new 
formula must be explored and utilized to address the decade-long conflict in the 
region. The on-going GPH-MILF Peace Talks perhaps would present a new political 
and administrative reality in the country, which necessarily affects the situation in 
other regions; we suggest the following points with regard to the situation in the 
Bangsamoro Homeland. First, the Bangsamoro Homeland should be governed with a 
genuine autonomy through the proposed "establishment of a 'state-sub-state' form of 
governance in a future Bangsamoro state," in which the leaders of the executive body 
and the legislative council are elected by all the Bangsamoro. This institution should 
be given a constitutional mandate and authority over its respective region. It should 
also have a full authority to exploit and use all resources within the jurisdiction of 
the said regional government. However, shares of revenues between the autonomous 
region and the central government to the incomes must be fixed in a just, but agreeable 
to both parties. These are important for the regional autonomous government so that 
it will enable them to develop the region and provide the medical and educational 
services for its people, so as to bridges the gap between this region and other regions 
in the country. 
Second, the Bangsamoro should be given the opportunity to have a free democratic 
practice to unite their region under unified executive and legislative institutions, 
meanwhile, preserving the government institutions at the state and local levels; keeping 
in mind the geographic and social peculiarity and the administrative feasibility. 
Third, the formation of the autonomous government and the legislative councils 
during transitional period should reflect the general popular consensus. That should be 
realized through a wide consultation with the political powers, which have influence in 
the region, and with the leaders of Civil Administration, which has the popular support, 
and with the freedom fighters and intellectuals from the Bangsamoro Homeland. An 
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agreement should be reached on a shared popular mechanism to be formed from the 
government, the fighters and the leaders of the region with the participation or even 
mediation of international community, to assure the success of negotiations, and 
follow-up on implementing the outcome of the final agreement and solve the emerging 
problems. 
Fourth, the region should be represented in the higher constitutional positions during 
the transitional period. It should also be represented in the government cabinet and 
commissions. Its representation in the congress should reflect its population weight, 
and the representatives of the region should be selected by the executive of the regional 
government based on their professional qualifications and good conduct. 
Fifth, a committee should be formed to assess the damage that was caused by the 
conflict, and compensate the victims-individuals or groups-for their losses. 
Sixth, all those who committed criminal atrocities against the civilians should be tried 
on court, and the recommendations stipulated on the reports prepared by the GPH- 
MILF Fact-finding Committee and the International Fact-finding Mission should be 
implemented, and that be done through a natural and civil supervision. This process 
should no stop pardoning and forgiving of revenges, with the consent of the victimized 
parties, in order to preserve the neighborhood relations, and repair the social fabric and 
seek the forgiveness and reward from Allah (SWT). 
Seven, all those who were detained for political reasons associated with the Southern 
Philippine problem should be released. Investigations on the cases of women's 
rape should be opened; and the perpetrators must be punished, and victims should 
be provided with spiritual, psychological and medical care. In addition that, those 
who were sacked from the civil and military services should be reinstated in their 
previous jobs. 
Eight, because the CivilPolitical Administration is a deeply rooted traditional system 
in the region, whichJstill has an active role in organizing the society, the selection of 
officials for this administration should be built on the concession and agreement of 
people in the area; and it should not be exploited for political and partisanship gains. It 
should be given both legal and judicial authority and should be supported financially 
and morally to enable it to perform its role effectively. A balance should be struck 
between its traditional, conventional role and the requirements of the new situation 
in which people are governed by a democratically elected authority with its executive 
and judicial institutions. The Civil Administration should be revived in the sphere 
of peaceful co-existence and social reconciliation and in tahng care of the inherited 
traditions in fishing and fanning, so as to benefit all individuals in the society. 
Lastly, a permanent committee should be formed in different areas with the task of 
Specifying the "pusaka a lupa" or Ancestral Domain passage and their timings, based 
on a clear map that considers the interests of both the Bangsamoro and the Christian- 
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Filipino settlers. The GPH and MILF with the aid of international community should 
insure the implementation of the decisions taken by this committee. 
The Economic Dimension 
As the land-grabbing issue and the complaint of poor development and services 
constitute some of the most important causes of conflict in the Southern Philippines, 
then the economical factor becomes a principal approach for solving the problem. 
In this regard we advise that the following should be taken into consideration. First 
study the problem of land-conflict in the region, in a way that makes the life styles 
that depend on fanning fit with the available land and plapt resources. Consideration 
should be paid to settling land dsputes and the Philippine government should revoke 
laws declaring ancestral "pusaka a lupa" as public land. Thus, the Manila government 3 
should pass protection laws to preserve the Bangsamoro ancestral domain. 
Then, a special commission should be set up to look into the land possession in the 
region, in the light of the inherited rights which are locally accepted and based on the 
citizenship rights in which all citizens are equal despite of their religion or tribe, and 
according to the economical feasibility in exploiting the land. The commission should 
take care of planning for land uses, and specify the bases for land possession and take 
care of the process of land registration. The commission has the right to recommend 
the compensation. for the groups or individuals who lose their inherited or acquired 
right as a result of implementing the above-mentioned bases. 
After that, the establishment of a special commission for development and 
reconstruction of the region using local and international funds through Bangsamoro 
Development Agency (BDA), so as to build the infrastructures and complete the 
development projects which have been halted such as the Mal-Mar Irrigation Project 
and others. 
Finally, encouragement of investments and diversification of resources, and living- 
gaining sources for ordinary citizens, according to a comprehensive development 
plan for all provinces, and encourage the small industries that depend on local raw 
materials, through funding their capital and facilitating the marketing of products 
outside the region. 
The Security Dimension 
Since the lack of security in the Southern Philippines has already reached its limit 
because of the influx of weapon from foreign countries, and because the forming of 
militias and the spread of the phenomenon of armed robbery and the appearance of 
opposition armed movements, both official and popular efforts should come together 
to maintain the security all over the region, so as to instill tranquility in the hearts of 
the displaced and refugees, especially women, children and elderly people, through 
the implementation of the following steps. First, the strict abidance by the cease-fire 
People (IDPs). All this has created a real humanitarian catastrophe. The humanitarian 
side should be given the priority in the solutions, because most of the victims are 
weak people such as women, children and elderly. In this regard we recommend 
the following. First, the full abidance by the humanitarian Protocol, which requires 
the parties to facilitate the delivery of humanitarian relief for the victims of military 
operations, and open the roads for humanitarian organizations, and not to obstruct 
their workers, and protect the displaced camps. 
Second. secure the delivery of humanitarian needs for all affected by war in the camps, 
towns, and villages. The distribution of relief for sufferers in the different areas should 
be balanced; and concern should be shown for the Bangsamoro refugees in Sabah, 
Malaysia. The BDA and other duly accredited organizations should monitor and 
coordinate the work of the relief organizations both within and abroad (Sabah). 
Third. the voluntary relocations of displaced and refugees in their home areas after 
providing them with security. food, shelter, medication and education. The remains 
of war should be removed. and the damaged amenities and institutions should be 
maintained. In addition to that, sufficient strategic reserves of medicine and foods 
should be stored to avoid any shortages. 
Fourth. the formation of a committee to asses post-war needs, in par with the 
committee formed by the Philippine government and the MILF and other secessionist 
movements in the Southern Philippines. The international community should support 
this committee, which could be attached to the Southern Philippine War-affected 
Areas Rehabilitation Fund. 
Fifth, the provision of intensive programs and comprehensive activities to provide 
physical and psychological treatments for the victims of violations, and train them to 
do jobs that suit them. Those victims should be made aware of their human right. The 
formation of local organizations that can work in the same field should be encouraged. 
Their activists should be trained in the International and regional laws and techniques 
of work. The capacity of civil society organizations should be built and women 
should be empowered, and their political, economic, cultural and social role should 
be activated, and ensure their participation in the decision-making bodies at all levels. 
Last, the establishment of maternity and childhood fund to alleviate the war damages. 
The Social Dimension 
The Bangsamoro Homeland was known for its stability, social solidarity and intertribal 
mix up in the past that was because of their commitment to the pure Islamic values 
and the established traditions in tolerance and co-existence. However, the fallouts 
of the current crisis gave that social fabric a deadly strike. That is why a long-term 
plan is needed to patch it up and take it back to its previous state. In this regard we 
suggest the following. First. the promotion of the Bangsamoro Homeland's historical, 
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social and cultural unifying characters. The institutions of higher education and the 
organizations of civil society should contribute to this role. The regional government 
should encourage the establishment of corporations and organizations that involve 
many tribes and that work for the service of all people in the region. 
Second, make use of the educational, religions and information institutions to patch 
the social fabric and to overcome the narrow tribal fanaticism, religious differences 
and denounce the call for arrogance, exclusions, and the rush towards political and 
administrative positions, relying on pure tribal bases, and criminalize the call for 
violence and the sedition among tribes. 
Third, care should be taken for education and improve its services and widen its bases, 
because it is very influential in shaping the character and educating the individuals. 
The boarding school system should be continued in some model schools in big towns 
because of their role in cultural integration and social cohesion. 
Fourth, involve the local communities and the grassroots entities in the process of 
social reconciliation and the settlement of pending disputes, and the revival of the 
traditions of tolerance, co-existence and integration; and legalize the traditions of 
dispute solving and give them the legal consideration. 
Fifth, activate the role of Civil Administration in settlement of tribal disputes, and in 
the process of patching the social fabric; and involve the organizations of civil society 
and the women in the call for discarding violence and fighting. Shared social entities 
should be built. Contacts and ties between tribes and religions and their relatives both 
within and outside the region should be encouraged. 
Last, the international community, the Manila regime, the regional government, 
the political and civil powers should pledge to support the reconciliation and social 
co-existence in the region. They should refrain from exploiting tribal fanaticism in 
political competitions. A voluntary and popular entity for all people of the Southern 
Philippines should be created to protect their unity and support their social fabric, and 
contribute to solving the emerging problems and serve the interests of the region. 
CONCLUSION 
The conflict of the Southern Philippines has reached its limits and the masses are 
becoming impatient. The GPH and MlLF and other Bangsamoro secessionist groups 
should realize that there is no better option for them than to reach compromise position 
so as to live together in that part of the world. This conflict is a solvable problem, 
especially if the dominant Christian-Filipino people and their leaders realize that 
there is no better option for them than to give the Bangsarnoro self-determination. 
Indeed, if a determination of the wise men and influential leaders in the region is put 
to work and the efforts are gathered together they can definitely solve the root causes 
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laws, and social situations. The GPH must lead an active effort to rectify the social ; 
disintegration and build the trust and confidence, in addition to its role in maintaining ' 
security and realizing stability and development in the Southern Philippines. In this , 
regards, despites of its significant progress, it seems, the GPH-MILF peace process has 
a long way to go in achieving a comprehensive, just and lasting negotiated political 
settlement in the Southern Philippines. 
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